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ABSTRACT 
 
Negotiations in the real world have many features which tend to be ignored in 
policy modeling. They are often multilateral, involving many negotiating parties with 
preferences over outcomes that can differ substantially. They are also often multi-
dimensional, in the sense that several policies are negotiated over simultaneously. Trade 
negotiations are a prime example, as are negotiations over environmental policies to 
abate carbon dioxide. We demonstrate how one can formally model this type of 
negotiation process. We use a policy-oriented computable general equilibrium model to 
generate preference functions which are then used in a formal multilateral bargaining 
game. The case study is to climate change policy, but the main contribution is to 
demonstrate how one can integrate formal economic models of the impacts of policies 
with formal bargaining models of the negotiations over those policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One fundamental problem in multilateral negotiations over CO2 abatement 
policies is the existence of conflicting interests because those policies are public goods. 
Every country is better off if abatement of CO2 emissions take place in all countries 
than if no abatement is undertaken. However, given that other countries are undertaking 
abatement the welfare of each country is higher if it does not undertake any abatement. 
Moreover, unilateral abatement policies are not effective.1A possible solution requires a 
negotiation setting in which any policy proposal can only be considered if proposed by 
a majority of the countries involved. In other words, if coalition formation in proposals 
and voting is accepted there may be less of a  problem of individual free riding, since 
the proposal represents the interests of its proposers.  
We evaluate one such institution for multilateral bargaining (MB) in several 
stages. First, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (International 
Impact Assessment Model – IIAM) developed by Bernstein, Montgomery, and 
Rutherford (1997), we generate estimates of the welfare effects for OECD countries 
from several CO2 abatement policies. An abatement policy consists of a quantity 
reduction in CO2 emissions and a time limit. Second, using the welfare changes 
calculated in the first stage, we estimate political preference functions for each country. 
A political preference function specifies how the welfare of each country varies as the 
abatement policy moves away from the ideal vector of that country. Third, using the 
estimated preference functions we numerically evaluate the multilateral bargaining 
institution under alternative specifications with respect to the set of countries 
undertaking abatement, the trade regime allowed, and the presence or absence of a 
coordinating authority in the negotiations. 
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 There is an extensive list of studies on this issue. For a review see Pinto (1998). Harrison and Kristrm 
(1998) provide a detailed evaluation for Sweden. 
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WELFARE IMPACTS OF ABATEMENT POLICIES 
The IIAM is a dynamic, general equilibrium, multiregional, trade model with 25 
regions. The model is formulated as two separate but compatible general equilibrium 
models. The first is a multiregional trade model that provides an approximation of the 
changes in international terms of trade that could result from CO2 restrictions imposed 
on a subset of countries. The second is a general purpose small open economy model 
that is used to study the implications of changes in international prices for particular 
countries. The CO2 restrictions to be evaluated consist of relative abatement in CO2 
emissions relative to 1992 levels, and a time limit to accomplish the required reduction. 
We simulated nine different scenarios shown in Table 1. For simplicity, the abatement 
year is referred to as the “breadth” of the abatement policy and the percent of abatement 
is referred to as the “depth” of the abatement policy. 
Table 1: Abatement policies scenarios 
Breadth /Depth  
 
10% 15% 20% 
2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
2005 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
2000 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 
 
The policy instrument considered in the IIAM are carbon emission permits that 
entitle the permit owner to release a certain amount of CO2 during some time period. 
Restricting the amount of available permits allows governments to reduce the amount of 
CO2 released. The permits may either be used by the country owning them, or they may 
be sold to another country that is carbon restricted. Therefore, we evaluate the welfare 
impacts2 of each of the nine scenarios in Table 1 under two distinct situations regarding 
the possibility of trade in emission permits. The No Trade situation consists of not 
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 Welfare impacts are relative to the Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario for each country from each 
abatement policy simulated, as measured by the equivalent variation in income in billions of 1992 US 
dollars. The BaU scenario corresponds to the absence of any policy initiative. 
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allowing the transaction of carbon permits among countries, and the Trade situation 
consists of allowing world trade in emission permits.  
The IIAM model includes 25 countries/regions. For the purpose of evaluating 
the MB institution we are only interested in OECD countries.3 Specifically, we consider 
two different sets of abating countries. Either all OECD member countries are carbon 
constrained, or only the USA and the EU are carbon constrained. 
 
ESTIMATION OF PREFERENCES 
We assume that countries have Euclidean preferences over the policy space. In 
other words, we assume that as the policy vector that is implemented moves away from 
an ideal point in the policy space, the utility of each country/region i, U(i), declines at a 
constant rate. The following equation shows the specific functional form assumed for 
each country/region preference function: 
 
( )U i
j
( ) =  (i) - (i)* X(j) - A(i, j)α β
=
∑
1
2 2
 
with i=1, 2, ..., 7, and j= breadth, depth. 
U(i) is the utility for country i, measured as the percentage change in the 
country’s equivalent variation at 1992 dollars, X(j)4 is the breadth and depth of any 
policy vector. Preference functions are characterized by three parameters. The breadth 
and depth of the most preferred policy vector, A(i,j); the utility level  attained by each 
country/region at the most preferred policy vector, α(i); and the rate of decline of utility 
as the policy vector moves away from the ideal point, β(i). Estimation of the parameters 
for each country/region was formulated with GAMS software and solvers described in 
                                                           
3
 In fact, based on past CO2 negotiations, it is fairly plausible to assume that only OECD member 
countries will undertake or finance abatement policies. 
4
 Specifically, X(1)= 2000, 2005, or 2010, and X(2)=10, 15, or 20%. 
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Brooke et al. (1992).5 OECD member countries are grouped in seven sets: Australia 
(AUS), New Zealand (NZL), Japan (JPN), Canada (CAN), USA, European Union (EU 
– includes 12 countries), and EU3 (including Austria, Finland, and Sweden). 
One problem with implementing multilateral negotiations over abatement 
policies consists of establishing a credible default outcome in the event that negotiations 
fail. Moreover, countries in the negotiations need to expect some benefit from CO2 
abatement policies, otherwise no agreement would be preferred to any agreement. We 
assume that if negotiations fail, countries suffer no welfare loss or gain, so that the 
welfare change is zero. Behind this is the assumption that global warming would induce 
no welfare change, and, as a corollary, the assumption that no welfare gain occurs 
because of reduced carbon emissions. However, developed countries have agreed to 
abate carbon emissions. By doing so, they implicitly attribute some benefit to abatement 
of carbon emissions. In order for the countries at the negotiation table to have any 
incentive to reach an agreement, the perceived welfare from a possible agreement must 
exceed the welfare they enjoy if negotiations fail. We therefore assume that benefits of 
abatement are 1% of welfare in every country. This ensures that each country in our MB 
negotiation perceives some net benefit from participating; they may still experience 
very different welfare costs from the alternative proposals. Hence one unit is added to 
the intercept of each country’s utility function, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.  
We estimate four sets of preferences by varying the set of countries with CO2 
emission constraints and the trade regime in emission permits. The first two sets of 
preference function estimates correspond to the case of abatement by all OECD 
members assuming No trade and Trade in emission permits, respectively (Table 2). The 
                                                           
5
 Assuming Euclidean preferences, we estimate α(i), β(i) and A(i,j) for each i using the welfare of i for all 
nine scenarios in Table 1. The criteria used in the estimation was to minimize the sum of squared 
residuals. Given the nonlinear nature of the utility function the estimation entailed simple non-linear 
optimization algorithms. Details are provided in Pinto (1998). 
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other two sets refer to the case of abatement by the EU (all 15 countries) and the USA, 
assuming Trade and No Trade, respectively (Table 3).  
Table 2: Ideal points and utility parameters under OECD abatement  
Ideal points and utility parameters for OECD members under OECD abatement (No Trade) 
 
Policy Utility parameters 
Country Breadth Depth Coefficient Intercept (1) 
AUS 2006.53 10 0.0287 1.0272 
NZL 2006.88 10 0.0469 0.704 
JPN 2007.17 10 0.0224 0.826 
CAN 2006.95 10 0.0407 0.7852 
USA 2006.70 10 0.0415 0.7872 
E_U 2006.95 10 0.0301 0.7903 
EU3 2007.10 10 0.0210 0.8065 
Ideal points and utility parameters for OECD members under OECD abatement (Trade) 
 
Policy Utility parameters 
Country Breadth Depth Coefficient Intercept (1) 
AUS 2006.45 10 0.0255 1 
NZL 2006.88 10 0.0469 0.794 
JPN 2007.17 10 0.0224 0.826 
CAN 2006.95 10 0.0407 0.7852 
USA 2006.70 10 0.0415 0.7872 
E_U 2006.95 10 0.0301 0.7903 
EU3 2007.09 10 0.0210 0.8065 
(1) A value of 1 was added to the intercept estimates 
Table 2 presents OECD members’ ideal points regarding the depth and breadth 
of the abatement policy under No Trade in emission permits and under Trade. All 
OECD countries prefer to abate only 10% of carbon emissions, independently of the 
assumed trade regime. Moreover, the trade regime does not have any influence on the 
ideal time limit of abatement for each of the seven countries/regions in the OECD. 
However, there is some variation among countries. The EU3 and JPN prefer later 
abatement than the other countries (2007.10, and 2007.17, respectively). On the other 
hand, AUS prefers abatement earlier than any of the other countries (2006.45, 
approximately). The E_U and CAN prefer to defer abatement slightly until 2006.95. 
NZL and the USA prefer earlier abatement than the E_U and CAN (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Estimated ideal policy vector under OECD abatement 
 
The estimated parameters of the utility function for each country are invariant to 
changes in the trade regime, apart from AUS. However, there is some variation across 
country/region. AUS is the country with highest utility at its optimal policy vector. NZL 
is the country with lowest utility at the optimal policy vector. Examining the rate of 
decline of utility as the policy vector moves away from the ideal point of each country, 
we conclude that NZL is the country most affected by abatement policies, followed by 
CAN and the USA. AUS is the country with lowest welfare cost of abatement. 
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Table 3: Ideal points and utility parameters under USA/EU abatement  
Ideal points and utility parameters for OECD members under USA/EU abatement (No Trade) 
 
Policy Utility parameters 
Country Breadth Depth Coefficient Intercept (1) 
AUS 2004.0686 18.8725 0.01 1 
NZL 2009.9385 12.1176 0.01 1 
JPN 2009.3134 14.0207 0.01 1 
CAN 2004.4024 13.4656 0.01 1 
USA 2006.7188 10.000 0.0416 0.7731 
E_U 2006.9716 10.000 0.0304 0.7756 
EU3 2007.1225 10.000 0.0212 0.7936 
Ideal points and utility parameters for OECD members under USA/EU abatement (Trade) 
 
Policy Utility parameters 
Country Breadth Depth Coefficient Intercept (1) 
AUS 2008.9418 16.0337 0.01 1 
NZL 2007.9983 11.3302 0.01 1 
JPN 2009.2992 16.6830 0.01 1 
CAN 2007.5143 11.4894 0.01 1 
USA 2007.1780 10.000 0.0184 0.8433 
E_U 2007.3205 10.000 0.0131 0.8533 
EU3 2007.3561 10.000 0.0086 0.8994 
(1) A value of 1 was added to the intercept estimates 
Table 3 presents the estimated ideal points of OECD members in terms of the 
depth and breadth of the abatement policy when only the USA and the EU are abating 
or financing CO2 emissions abatement. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 2, if trade in 
emission permits is not allowed the USA and the EU prefer to abate less and later than 
the other countries. Pinto (1998; chapter 5) explains this result as follows, based on a 
detailed review of the underlying simulations results. As some OECD countries abate, 
they lose competitiveness relative to other countries, mainly other OECD countries. 
Thus, the tighter the cut in emissions by the USA and the EU, the higher the welfare of 
other OECD members and the lower the welfare of the abating countries. 
Compared to the estimates obtained if trade in emission permits is allowed, the  
ideal points of abating countries consist of later cuts under Trade in emission permits 
than under No Trade in emission permits. However, the ideal depth of abatement is the 
same. 
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Figure 2: Estimated ideal policy vector under USA/EU abatement 
Preferences for non-abating countries at the negotiations do not follow a unique 
pattern. AUS and CAN prefer later and higher emission abatement, while NZL and JPN 
prefer earlier abatement under Trade than under No Trade. These differences are 
primarily attributable to differences in the countries relative abatement costs, and the 
extent to which these countries benefit from trade in emission permits. As trade in 
emission permits is allowed, unconstrained countries with lower abatement costs than 
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those of constrained countries tend to realize welfare gains by selling abatement to 
constrained countries. Both CAN and AUS are expected to have relatively higher 
welfare gains as the regime moves from No Trade in emission permits to Trade than 
NZL or JPN. Moreover, the rate at which utility in abating countries declines as the 
policy vector moves away from the ideal point is higher under No Trade in emission 
permits. Thus, abating countries stand to lose more under No Trade in emission permits 
than under Trade in emission permits. On the other hand, abating countries’ utility level 
at their ideal points is lower under No Trade than under Trade. 
Having completed the process of preference functions estimation, we can now 
proceed to analyze the MB institution. 
 
THE MULTILATERAL BARGAINING MODEL 
The MB game developed by Rausser and Simon (1991) can be viewed as an 
extension of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offer bargaining game. In Rubinstein’s 
model, two players bargain over the division of a pie of size one. In the first round, one 
of the players, the proposer, offers a division of the pie to the other player. In the second 
round, this other player either accepts or rejects the proposed division. If he accepts then 
the game ends with the proposed division being implemented. If he rejects it is his turn 
to propose an alternative division. In Rubinstein’s game the bargaining can go on for an 
infinite number of periods.  
Rausser and Simon’s (1991) formulation differs in two critical respects from 
Rubinstein’s formulation: they incorporate multiple players and multidimensional issue 
spaces. The MB game consists of T rounds. Each round is divided into three subperiods. 
In the first subperiod nature chooses a player to be a proposer according to a 
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prespecified vector of strictly positive “access probabilities”.6 In the second subperiod 
the proposer announces a coalition,7 of which he must be a member, and a policy vector 
that is feasible8 for that coalition. In the third subperiod the remaining members of the 
proposed coalition each choose whether to accept or reject the proposed policy vector. If 
all accept, the game ends. If at least one member rejects, the next period begins and a 
new proposer is selected. If the last round of the game is reached without any agreement 
on a policy vector, a pre-specified disagreement outcome is implemented. Therefore, the 
purpose of the negotiation is to select a policy vector from a set of possible vectors and 
a voting coalition from a set of admissible coalitions.  
An admissible coalition is a subset of the players that has the authority to impose 
a policy choice on the whole group. In a majority rule bargaining game, an admissible 
coalition must contain a majority of the players.9 In this particular application we 
assume that an admissible coalition must contain one specific player referred to as the 
central player. 
The central player is distinguished from the other players by three 
characteristics. First, the central player must be in every coalition. Second, the utility 
function of the central player must be a function of the utility of the other players with 
the utility of each player receiving a strictly positive weight. 10 Third, the central player 
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 By access probabilities we mean the probability of a particular player being called to propose a policy 
vector and a voting coalition. 
7
 A coalition is a set of players. 
8
 A feasible policy vector is one that involves an abatement policy that all members of the proposed 
voting coalition would vote for in comparison to the disagreement outcome.  
9
 A coalition is admissible if it contains a majority of the players, assuming all players have the same 
voting power. Alternatively, if players have different voting power such as in the EU, a coalition is 
admissible if it consists of a subset of players that have a majority of the voting power.  
10
 Specifically, we assume a linear utility function for the government. The arguments of this utility 
function are the utility of each country involved in the game. That is, the utility of each country is a 
perfect substitute for the utility of other countries.  
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must have some positive access probability. The existence of a central player guarantees 
a solution.11  
The equilibrium concept usually employed in this kind of game is subgame 
perfection. A subgame perfect equilibrium for a game is a strategy profile with the 
property that at every sub-period of the game each player’s choice is optimal given the 
strategies specified by the other players. This concept is not sufficiently discriminating 
since the MB game has many subgame perfect equilibria, some of which have 
undesirable characteristics. For any game in which at least two players are required for 
agreement, any policy that is weakly preferred by all players relative to the 
disagreement outcome can be implemented with certainty as a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Several refinements eliminate these equilibria, and  Rausser and Simon 
(1991) specifically employ the properness equilibrium originally developed by Myerson 
(1987). 
 
APPLYING THE MB MODEL 
In our application the players are the seven regions/countries constituting the 
OECD. These countries are modeled as negotiating over the depth and the breadth of 
the abatement policy. Therefore, countries in the negotiation choose a policy vector and 
a coalition of countries willing to vote for the proposal. The policy vector consists of a 
specific emission cut and a specific year to attain it. The proposed coalition must be an 
admissible coalition as previously defined. The central player is, in our application, 
designated by the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), which is the 
organization currently supervising the negotiations. It seems reasonable to assume that 
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 The solution is in general deterministic, and is in the core of the corresponding cooperative game. In 
the context of the MB institution, a vector x is in the core if it is feasible for some coalition and if, for 
every coalition C, there is no feasible vector that is weakly preferred to x by each member of C and 
strictly preferred by one member. Rausser and Simon (1991) present the formal model along with proofs 
of those results. They also discuss some generalizations of the model not used in this application (e.g., 
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the IPCC exerts some influence over climate change negotiations. We analyze the role 
that the IPCC must exert in the negotiations so that the negotiating parties reach an 
agreement. This evaluation is undertaken by varying the IPCC’s access probability and 
voting power.  
Table 4: Overview of Simulations 
       
      IPCC out 
    OECD abatement   
  No trade    IPCC in 
       
      IPCC out 
       
    USA/EU abatement  IPCC in and IPCC in with 
unanimity 
Simulations       
      IPCC out 
    OECD abatement   
      IPCC in  
  Trade     
      IPCC out 
    USA/EU abatement   
      IPCC in 
       
 
Table 4 summarizes the negotiation simulations performed. Two trade regimes, 
No Trade and Trade, are considered. In each case we consider abatement by either the 
whole OECD or just the USA and the EU. In other words, there are two possible 
abating coalitions, one formed by all negotiating parties and one constituted by the USA 
and the EU. Additionally, we consider two cases regarding the presence or absence of 
the IPCC in the negotiations.  
 
MB GAME WITH NO TRADE IN EMISSION PERMITS  
Assuming trade in emission permits is not allowed, in this section we analyze 
the outcome of MB under five different settings. In terms of the abating coalition, we 
analyze the case where all OECD member parties are willing to undertake abatement 
and the case where only the USA and the EU are committed to abating carbon 
                                                                                                                                                                          
allowing for time discounting during negotiations and risk aversion). 
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emissions. For each abating coalition we additionally consider the influence of the IPCC 
on the speed and outcome of the negotiations. We also consider the effect of a 
unanimity rule when the abating coalition is formed by the USA and the EU. Table 5 
shows the outcomes of these simulations using the preferences reported in the first set 
of Tables 2 and 3. 
The first column in Table 5 indicates the number of negotiation rounds 
necessary to reach an agreement. The second column lists the coalition proposed by 
each player. Potential members in any coalition are AUS, NZL, JPN, CAN, USA, E_U, 
EU3, and the IPCC. The defined sequences follow this order where a “1” indicates that 
the country is in the coalition and a “0” indicates that the country is out of the coalition. 
For example, the sequence 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 indicates that AUS, NZL, and USA are out of 
the coalition, and that JPN, E_U, EU3, and IPCC are in the coalition.12 The third 
column indicates the country proposing the coalition and the abatement policy. The 
third and fourth columns indicate the proposed policy breadth and depth. The remaining 
columns list each country’s payoff from the proposed abatement policies. The expected 
payoff for each country is a weighted average of the payoffs earned by the country in 
each abatement policy, where the weights are the access probabilities of the countries 
making the proposal.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
12
 The voting coalition reported in Tables 5 and 6 for each player may be equivalent to other voting 
coalitions that generate the same payoff to the proposing player. However, only one of the equivalent 
voting coalitions is reported. For more detailed information see Pinto (1998, p.253). 
13
 The proposed policies and the resulting payoffs reported in Table 5 refer to the last round of 
negotiations. 
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Table 5: MB Simulations under No Trade in emission permits 
Number 
Rounds 
Coalition 
members 
Proposing 
country 
Breadth Depth AUS 
payoff 
NZL 
payoff 
JPN 
payoff 
CAN 
payoff 
USA 
payoff 
E_U 
payoff 
EU3 
payoff 
IPCC 
payoff 
OECD abatement/No IPCC 
5 11011101 AUS 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 ------ 
 01011101 NZL 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 ------ 
 00110111 JPN 2006.954 10.00 1.015 0.790 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 11111101 CAN 2006.946 10.00 1.015 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 00011111 USA 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 ------ 
 11111101 E _U 2006.952 10.00 1.015 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 00110111 EU3 2006.954 10.00 1.015 0.790 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 Expected payoff   1.016 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.803 ------ 
OECD abatement/IPCC in 
5 11010001 AUS 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 5.783 
 
01011101 NZL 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 5.783 
 
00110111 JPN 2006.951 10.00 1.015 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.783 
 
11111101 CAN 2006.946 10.00 1.015 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.783 
 
00011111 USA 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 5.783 
 
00110111 E _U 2006.951 10.00 1.015 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.783 
 
00110111 EU3 2006.951 10.00 1.015 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.783 
 
11111101
 
IPCC 2006.918 10.00 1.016 0.792 0.820 9.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 5.783 
 
Expected payoff   1.016 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.778 0.790 0.803 5.783 
USA and EU abatement/IPCC out 
16 10111001 AUS 2006.863 10.22 0.909 0.964 0.955 0.959 0.762 0.768 0.786 ------ 
 
01100111 NZL 2007.062 10.41 0.908 0.965 0.955 0.957 0.758 0.770 0.790 ------ 
 
11110111 JPN 2007.005 10.20 0.908 0.965 0.955 0.958 0.759 0.770 0.789 ------ 
 
10111001 CAN 2006.863 10.22 0.909 0.964 0.955 0.959 0.762 0.768 0.786 ------ 
 
10011101 USA 2006.803 10.11 0.908 0.963 0.953 0.959 0.768 0.770 0.786 ------ 
 
01001111 E _U 2007.016 10.07 0.907 0.964 0.954 0.957 0.760 0.773 0.791 ------ 
 
01100111 EU3 2007.091 10.08 0.907 0.965 0.955 0.957 0.757 0.771 0.792 ------ 
 
Expected payoff   0.908 0.964 0.955 0.958 0.761 0.770 0.789 ------ 
USA and EU abatement/IPCC in 
13 10111001 AUS 2006.881 10.17 0.909 0.964 0.954 0.959 0.763 0.770 0.787 6.106 
 
01100111 NZL 2007.035 10.11 0.908 0.965 0.955 0.957 0.759 0.772 0.791 6.106 
 
11110011 JPN 2006.989 10.12 0.908 0.965 0.955 0.958 0.760 0.771 0.789 6.106 
 
10111001 CAN 2006.881 10.17 0.909 0.964 0.954 0.959 0.763 0.770 0.787 6.106 
 
10011101 USA 2006.844 10.09 0.908 0.963 0.954 0.958 0.767 0.771 0.787 6.108 
 
01001111 E _U 2006.991 10.08 0.907 0.964 0.954 0.957 0.761 0.773 0.790 6.108 
 
01100111 EU 2007.055 10.07 0.907 0.965 0.954 0.957 0.759 0.772 0.792 6.106 
 
10011101 IPCC 2006.890 10.10 0.908 0.963 0.954 0.958 0.765 0.772 0.788 6.108 
 
Expected payoff  0.908 0.964 0.954 0.958 0.762 0.771 0.789 6.107 
USA and EU abatement/IPCC in with unanimity 
4 11111111 AUS 2006.718 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 NZL 2006.720 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 JPN 2006.720 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 CAN 2006.718 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 USA 2006.719 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 E _U 2006.719 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 EU 2006.719 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
11111111 IPCC 2006.719 12.29 0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
 
Expected payoff   0.929 0.968 0.969 0.974 0.678 0.706 0.744 5.967 
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The first set of numbers in Table 5 show the results of the MB game assuming 
that the IPCC takes no role at the negotiations. Specifically, the IPCC has no access to 
make proposals (its access probability is zero), and it has no voting power. In practical 
terms, this corresponds to a situation where the IPCC is absent from negotiations.14 The 
game reaches equilibrium after 5 rounds of negotiations, characterized by all players 
proposing an emission cut of 10% by about the year 2006.9. The simulation reported in 
the second set of results in Table 5 differ from the previous one in terms of the role 
attributed to the IPCC. Specifically, the IPCC is given the same access probability and 
voting power as the other parties in the negotiations. Comparison of the two sets of 
results shows that the presence of the IPCC in this setting has no influence on the policy 
vector agreed or on the speed of the negotiations. The voting coalition proposed by each 
country/region is also invariant with the presence/absence of the IPCC.15 
These results refer to situations in which the negotiating countries/regions have 
compatible interests, in the sense that their preferences are for abatement policies 
involving as little abatement as possible, and as late as possible, despite some regional 
variation. A more interesting case consists in analyzing situations of conflicting interest. 
An example of such a situation would be imposing carbon restrictions on only some of 
the negotiating countries/regions (the last three sets of results in Table 5 refer to such 
situations). 
Assuming that only the USA and the EU are undertaking abatement activities, 
Table 5 shows that inclusion of the IPCC in the negotiations increases the speed of 
negotiations, but that the number of rounds required to reach an agreement is 
significantly higher than in the case where all parties were carbon constrained. 
                                                           
14
 Although the IPCC is present in the game, the assumption that it has no access to make proposals and 
has no voting power renders the IPCC’s proposal unimportant. 
15
 The reported voting coalition proposed by the E_U and the EU3 varies with the presence/absence of the 
IPCC, however, these countries are indifferent between the two coalitions reported. 
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Considering the policy vector proposed by each country/region in the last round, 
the negotiated breadth is very similar in both situations, but the depth is in general 
smaller when the IPCC is present in the negotiations. In fact, differences in the depth of 
the agreed abatement policy are between 0.3 and 0.01 percentage points, which are 
significant in terms of the implied quantity of carbon emissions. Voting coalitions 
proposed are similar under the presence and absence of the IPCC, although there is 
some variation across countries/regions. The E_U proposes a voting coalition with the 
USA, the EU3, and NZL, while the EU3 and the USA propose a voting coalition 
excluding each other and including NZL and JPN, while the USA includes AUS and 
CAN. Expected payoffs are equal or higher for abating countries when the IPCC is 
present. For non-abating countries, expected payoffs are equal or lower under the 
presence of the IPCC. 
To test the robustness of the MB institution to different decision rules we 
simulate negotiations under a unanimity rule. The last set of results in Table 5 show that 
requiring unanimity leads to higher emission abatement than in any of the situations 
analyzed. Moreover, the agreement is reached after only four rounds of negotiations. 
Since all players must agree with the policy vector proposed, the range of policy 
proposals is, in a sense, reduced. Non-abating countries must satisfy abating countries’ 
preferences and abating countries must satisfy non-abating countries’ preferences.  
MB GAME WITH TRADE IN EMISSION PERMITS  
Trade in emission permits allows countries more flexibility to achieve their 
emission targets. Each country can issue the amount of carbon emission permits 
according to a given target and then firms or governments can trade these permits in a 
world market. As stressed in Pinto (1998), if countries are to choose between a regime 
of non-tradable emission permits and a regime of tradable emission permits across 
regions, all countries prefer the latter. In this section we evaluate the MB game 
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assuming that countries can trade emission permits in a world market. The preference 
function estimates used in the simulations performed in this section are the second 
blocks of Tables 2 and 3.  
As can be seen from the negotiation outcomes reported in Table 6, we analyze 
four different specifications of the MB institution that vary the members of the abating 
coalition and the presence of the IPCC. The first set of results in Table 6 refer to the 
situation characterized by the absence of the IPCC and with the presence of all members 
of the OECD in the abating coalition. The second set refers to a situation with the same 
abating coalition but with the presence of the IPCC at the negotiations.  
By comparing the two situations we conclude that the presence of the IPCC only 
affects the number of rounds needed to reach an agreement. Specifically, if the IPCC is 
present at the negotiations only two rounds are necessary to reach an agreement. 
Although the voting coalition proposed by the E_U and the EU3 reported in Table 6 is 
different, in fact both countries are indifferent between the voting coalition they propose 
when the IPCC is present and when it is absent. If the abating coalition is composed of 
the USA and the EU the presence of the IPCC is significant on the speed of agreement 
(these results are in the third and fourth set of results in Table 6). Comparing the two 
sets of results we conclude that the presence of the IPCC significantly decreases the 
number of negotiation rounds needed to reach an agreement.  
If the abating coalition is formed by the USA and the EU, the agreed policy 
depends on the proposer selected by Nature. If the proposer is in the abating coalition 
the solution consists of approximately 11% emission abatement by the year 2007.8. On 
the other hand, if the proposer does not belong to the abating coalition the agreement 
consists of an 11.4% emission abatement by the year 2007.6/2007.8. Moreover, 
countries propose only two different voting coalitions. Specifically, they either propose 
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Table 6 : MB Simulations under Trade in emission permits 
Number Coalition Proposing Breadth Depth AUS NZL JPN CAN USA E_U EU3 IPCC 
OECD abatement/IPCC out 
5 11110001 AUS 2006.914 10.00 0.988 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 ------ 
 
01011101 NZL 2006.914 10.00 0.988 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 ------ 
 
00110111 JPN 2006.956 10.00 0.987 0.790 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 
11111101 CAN 2006.946 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 
00011111 USA 2006.914 10.00 0.988 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.789 0.803 ------ 
 
10001111 E _U 2006.952 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 
00110111 EU3 2006.956 10.00 0.987 0.790 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 ------ 
 
Expected payoff  0.988 0.791 0.821 0.784 0.777 0.790 0.803 ------ 
OECD abatement/IPCC in 
2 11110001 AUS 2006.927 10.00 0.988 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.790 0.803 5.755 
 
01011101 NZL 2006.927 10.00 0.988 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.790 0.803 5.755 
 
00110111 JPN 2006.952 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.755 
 
11111101 CAN 2006.946 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.755 
 
00011111 USA 2006.927 10.00 0.988 0.792 0.820 0.784 0.778 0.790 0.803 5.755 
 
11111101 E _U 2006.952 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.755 
 
00011111 EU 2006.952 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.755 
 
00011111 IPCC 2006.946 10.00 0.987 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.804 5.755 
 
Expected payoff  0.988 0.791 0.821 0.785 0.777 0.790 0.803 5.755 
USA and EU abatement/IPCC out 
6 11110001 AUS 2007.672 11.37 0.952 0.997 0.944 0.998 0.816 0.835 0.887 ------ 
 
11110001 NZL 2007.834 11.28 0.951 0.998 0.944 0.996 0.817 0.835 0.888 ------ 
 
11110001 JPN 2007.683 11.37 0.952 0.987 0.944 0.998 0.816 0.835 0.887 ------ 
 
11110001 CAN 2007.582 11.38 0.952 0.996 0.944 0.999 0.817 0.835 0.887 ------ 
 
01001111 USA 2007.778 10.97 0.948 0.996 0.941 0.994 0.822 0.839 0.890 ------ 
 
01001111 E _U 2007.808 10.96 0.948 0.996 0.941 0.994 0.822 0.839 0.890 ------ 
 
01001111 EU3 2007.816 10.95 0.948 0.996 0.941 0.994 0.822 0.839 0.890 ------ 
 
Expected payoff  0.950 0.996 0.943 0.996 0.819 0.837 0.889 ------ 
USA and EU abatement/IPCC in 
2 11110001 AUS 2007.672 11.37 0.952 0.997 0.944 0.998 0.817 0.835 0.887 6.429 
 
11110001 NZL 2007.851 11.25 0.951 0.998 0.944 0.996 0.817 0.836 0.888 6.429 
 
11110001 JPN 2007.683 11.37 0.952 0.997 0.944 0.998 0.816 0.835 0.887 6.429 
 
11110001 CAN 2007.556 11.37 0.951 0.996 0.944 0.999 0.817 0.835 0.887 6.429 
 
00011111 USA 2007.402 10.99 0.947 0.993 0.940 0.995 0.825 0.840 0.891 6.431 
 
01001111 E _U 2007.753 10.85 0.947 0.995 0.940 0.993 0.824 0.841 0.891 6.431 
 
01001111 EU3 2007.763 10.84 0.947 0.995 0.940 0.993 0.824 0.841 0.891 6.431 
 
01001111 IPCC 2007.601 10.96 0.948 0.995 0.940 0.995 0.824 0.840 0.891 6.432 
 
Expected payoff  0.949 0.996 0.942 0.996 0.821 0.838 0.889 6.430 
 
a voting coalition excluding the USA, the E_U, and the EU3, or a coalition excluding 
AUS, JPN, and CAN. Obviously, non-abating countries propose a coalition excluding 
all abating countries. On the other hand, abating countries propose a coalition excluding 
all but one non-abating country. In each case these proposals are sufficient to constitute 
an admissible coalition. The choice of NZL in the coalition proposed by abating 
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countries is explained by the fact that this is the country with preference for smaller 
emissions abatement amongst non-abating countries.  
What do we conclude by comparing the results under No Trade in emission 
permits with the results of the MB institution with Trade in emission permits? The MB 
solution obtained under No Trade in emission permits takes more time to reach than 
under Trade in emission permits, mainly because under Trade in emission permits non-
abating countries stand to gain more from an agreement than under No Trade. 
Consequently, agreement on a proposal is more difficult. On the other hand, countries 
agree on a lower abatement target and later emission abatement. 
If the abating coalition is composed of all OECD member countries the 
prediction of the MB model is very similar with respect to the abatement policy agreed 
and the voting coalition. If the abating coalition is defined as the USA and the EU the 
agreed policy proposal depends on the country proposing the policy and the voting 
coalition. Specifically, the abatement policy agreed to is more stringent under USA/EU 
abatement than under abatement by all OECD countries. 
The proposed target year for abatement depends on the members of the abating 
coalition. If all OECD countries are in the abating coalition they agree on 2006.9 or 
2007 as the target year. However, if only the USA and the EU are in the abating 
coalition then the target year depends on the country making the proposal. With respect 
to the choice of the voting coalition, players’ choices are independent of the role 
attributed to the IPCC under abatement by the USA, the E_U, and the EU3. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We propose and demonstrate the use of computable general equilibrium models 
and game theory to model multilateral economic policies.  
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The process of modeling and evaluating the effects of multilateral policies with 
economic implications was illustrated in the context of climate change. Specifically, 
using a CGE model we assessed the welfare effects of alternative carbon abatement 
policies in order to estimate political preference functions of OECD member countries. 
We found that if all OECD members are carbon constrained, the trade regime is 
unimportant and countries have very similar preferences regarding the abatement 
policy. On the other hand, if only some countries are carbon constrained, preferences 
regarding abatement policies vary across countries/regions.  
Using these estimated preferences, we simulated several negotiating scenarios. 
The negotiations are over the amount of abatement and the time limit to attain the 
required reduction in CO2 emissions and over a voting coalition willing to approve the 
proposed policy. If all negotiating countries are carbon constrained, the number of 
rounds necessary to reach an equilibrium is small, and the IPCC has no significant 
effect on the speed of the agreement or on the policy agreed. However, if only some 
countries are carbon constrained, then the interests of the negotiating parties are not 
compatible. In other words, carbon constrained countries prefer lower and later 
abatements while non-abating countries prefer higher and sooner abatements. Under this 
specification, negotiations take longer to converge to an equilibrium. In the case of 
USA/EU abatement with trade in emission permits, the equilibrium policy and voting 
coalition is not unique. The solution of the MB institution in such situation depends on 
the country making the proposal being in the abating coalition or not. Under these 
circumstances, inclusion of the IPCC leads to faster agreements.  
One limitation of these analyses results from the assumption that benefits of 
abatement are constant across the policy scenarios evaluated. One valuable extension 
would be to modify the IIAM model so as to compare the cost effectiveness across 
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abating coalitions maintaining the same global abatement target, as in Harrison and 
Rutherford (1998). In particular, countries would be committed to undertake some level 
of global abatement. That is, instead of being committed to reduce their own emissions 
by a given percentage they would be committed to reduce global emissions by a given 
percentage. The main difference between these two types of commitment is that under 
the latter carbon-constrained countries would have to compensate for any carbon 
leakage. Under this alternative, abatement benefits would be constant across coalitions 
subject to the same global emission target since the same environmental target would be 
met, by assumption. Thus, a direct comparison of welfare costs would be possible. 
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